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REUBEN G. GUSTAVSON MEMORIAL LECTURES
The Reuben G. Gustavson Memorial Lectures were
established in 1975 in recognition of Dr. Gustavson's contributions to education and research. Sponsored by Resources for the Future, Inc., of Washington, D.C., and four
universities he served, the lectures 'will be given annually
for fifteen years at the University of Arizona, the University
of Chicago, the University of Colorado, and the University
of Nebraska. Contributions to the lecture fund were made
by Resources for the Future, Laurance S. Rockefeller, William S. Paley, and by former students and colleagues at each
of the sponsoring institutions. The lectures deal with
Science and Society, with emphasis on questions related to
resources and the environment.
Robert Kates' lecture. the seventh of the series, was delivered at the University of Colorado on January 27, 1983.

INTRODUCTION
The ultimate problems of human existence are problems
of mystery; the penultimate problems are of survival. The
ultimate problems-the origin, mcaning, and purpose of a
human existence that contains the certainty of death-now
seem to transcend formal human organization dedicated to
their study and solution. Once the sole charge of priest and
philosopher, investigation of the mystny of life and death is
widely shared with science and ordinary men. The penultimate problems-the epoch-specific, O\"(,lTiding questions of
ollr time-seemingly require greatn formal human organization (Kates, 1969, p. I).

I wrote that at the end of 1969, newly returned from
Africa to a country swept up in the turmoil of foreign \\'ar
and social change. haying resolved to more systematically
address my scientific and political efforts to the penultimate
questions of my ficId, which sLUdies the resources and
hazards of the human environment. In so doing I was but
one of many. John Platt (1969) had just published in
Science his agenda of penultimate problems ordered by a
scale of crisis intensity Crable I).
Fourteen years later. no\\' in the midst of his "5 to 20 years
time to crisis," his list of major crises leading to "annihilation, great destruction, or change" still appears reIn·ant.
Nuclear or radiological, chemical, biological warfare
escalates. Around the world men and women take to the
streets and the ballot box to urge a halt to nuclear arms
escalation. A major famine affected some 10-15 million
people in the Sahel bet\\'Cen 1969 and 197:). The end of the
oceans did not occur in 1979, as predicted in till' cautionary
tale of eco-catastrophe by Paul Ehrlich (1970); nonetheless,
major issues concerning ecological balallce persist: the
interaction of biogeochemical cycles, the future of lTne\\"able resources, and the acceleration of species extinction.
The 1970s found the developmellt hopes of millions set
back in the face of worldwide economic decline. Local wars
underway or initiated since 1969 (killing 1,000 or more)
have involved 58 nations and claimed at least 8.3 million
lives (Sivard, 1982). The gap between rich and poor nations
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Crisis Intensity
(No. Affected)

Estimated Time to Crisis (Years)
1-5
5-20

Total Annihilation
(10 10)

Nuclear or RCBW
Escalation

Nuclear or RCBW
Escalation

Great Destruction
or Change (10 9)

(Too Soon)

Famines
Ecological Balance
Development Failures
Local Wars
Rich-Poor Gap

Widespread Almost
Unbearable Tension
(10 8)

Administrative
Management
Need for Participation
Group and Racial
Conflict
Poverty, Rising
Expectations
Environmental
Degradation

Poverty
Pollution
Racial Wars
Political Rigidity
Strong Dictatorships

Large-Scale Distress
(10 7)

Transportation
Diseases
Loss of Old Cultures

Housing
Education
Independence of
Big Powers
Communications Gap
Tab/(' l. Platt's llJtilJ Classification 01 Major Problems and Crist's
(abridged from Platt, llJ{jlJ, p. llllJ)

has increased absolutely if not relatively from a difference
in per capita income of $2300 in 1969, to $7700 in 1980
(Sivard, 1982),
That the agenda of penultimate problems persists is less
striking than the omissions from the list. Platt, writing
today, would surely include energy issues and the combination of global economic stagnation, inflation, and unemployment as major continuing crises that were absent from
his original list. My own unpublished list of penultimate
problems prepared that same year is shorter, more environmentally oriented, and focuses on cause, It contains three
closely linked problems:
I) The Malthusian dilemma, the resurgellt cOllcern with the

adequacy of resources and environment in the context of
current and future rates of population growth, and the
greater growth rates of technology and consumption.
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2) The growing, separate, global concentration of wealth
and poverty at a time of continued rising expectations,
with the prospect of worldwide social unrest and conflict
increasingly along racial, national, and continental lines.
3) The exceptional disparity between the greatly advanced
technological capability for change, including that of
destruction, and the primitive characwr of the human
behaviors and institutions prm'iding for control of this
new capability (Kates, 1969, pp. 3-~).

In the remainder of this lecture I want to address briefly
each of these issues in turn, using the hindsight of the last
14 years, some research that my colleagues at Clark University and I have undertaken on each of the problems, and the
remarkable set of institutions, research, and documentation
that developed during that period. A v\ard first about these
latter developments.

NEW INSTITUTIONS, RESEARCH METHODS,
AND DOCUMENTATION
When John Platt foresaw multiple crises that pose the
"gravest danger of destroying our society, our world, and
ourselves in any of a number of different ways well before
the end of this century," he called for " ... action. Who will
commit himself to this ... search for more ingenious and
fundamental solutions? Who will begin to assemble the
research teams and funds? \\'ho will begin to create those
full-time interdisciplinary centers that will be necessary for
testing detailed designs and turning them into effecti\'e
application?" (1969, p. 1121).
Fourteen years later a host of interdisciplinary centers
abound, the most recent being the World Resources Institute. Internationally, many of these institutes are part of the
IFIAS (International Federation of Institutes of Ach'anced
Studies) network. Another, based near Vienna, IIASA (the
International Institutc for Applied Systems Analysis) is
funded by 17 countries. The world's natural scientific disciplines have come together under the aegis of the International Council of Scientific Unions and its Scientific
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Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE),
while the world's nations work through the United Nations
Environment Program (UNEP) begun in Stockholm in
1972. New sources of funding have emerged-such as the
Club of Rome in the early '70s and the MacArthur Foundation in the '80s. Reuben Gustavson, who played such a key
role in the development of Resources for the Future, would
have been pleased by these developments.
In the wake of this creation of institutions has come a
wave of research, documentation, and methodology. The
development of global simulation models has triggered a
new growth controversy that has yet to abate, and a dozen
emulative or competitiw> models-seven of which were
recen tl y reviewed together (Meadows, Richardson, and
Bruckmann, 1982)-have been constructed. The energy crisis encouraged ne\'; accounting systems using BTUs or
joules instead of dullal~ to dOCUIIIl'Ilt energy flows or transactions. Progress was also made in documenting flows of
the global cycles of carbon, nitrogen, sulphur, and phosphorus in addition to water, and in monitoring the stratosphere, oceans, and the terrestrial biomass. Major international studies and revinvs have looked back at the year
1972 (Garcia, 1981), over the 10 years since the Stockholm
Conference on the Environment (Holdgate, Kassas, and
White, 1982), and forward on the next 20 years (U.S. Council on Environmental Quality, 1980), 50 years (Ridker and
Watson, 1980), 75 years (Freeman and Jahoda, 1978), and
200 years (Kahn, Brown, and Martel, 1976).
Despite this outpouring of institutions, research, and
documentation, a major caveat is in order. In the words of
the UNEP World Environment report, " ... the data base is of
very variable quality . . . there are startling gaps and a
special lack of reliable quantitative information on the
developing world. This must be remembered when projections of the future state of the world environment are examined: many are based on only the scantiest of evidence about
what, in fact, has been happening" (Holdgate, Kassas, and
White, 1982, p. 622).
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MENTAL MODELS OF THE FUTURE
Yet, questionable data appears to me a lesser issue than
other problems that may perplex the reader of these environmental diagnoses and prognoses. A more important
issue relates to the very different mental models authors
hold as to the future, differences that can be crudely summarized along three dimensions: trend, cause, and certainty.
Most people who have thought about the penultimate
problems have a mental image of the future that is convertible to a trend projection. Consider, for example, this
incomplete diagram of 1,000 years of past and future world
population (Figure I). Take a moment and see if you can
mentally extend it to the year 2050, when my granddaughter Sara will be 70, or if you are really brave and foolhardy,
to 2200.
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Figure I. World Populatioll. 1200-2200 A.D.: Do-It-Yourself Projl'llioll

Figure 2 shows the curves my students draw. These curves
reflect well the basic divisions in trend. Curve A is the cornucopian vision of continued exponential growth, at least
within Sara's lifetime; Curve B represents one of many
variants of reaching a steady-state, zero-population-growth
world; and Curve C is the Malthusian vision of overshoot
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and collapse (Meadows et aI., 1972). All of the analyses since
1969 are strongly influenced by their authors' vision of the
potential for either growth, steady state, or collapse.
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Figure 2. World Population, 1200-2200 A.D.: Altt'rnative Projections

Beliefs as to the cause of such trends also differ widely.
Some see physical limits or the behavior of natural systems
as prime movers; others find cause in society (social or economic organization) or culture; still others highlight the
autonomous role of technology; and still others, combinations thereof. Sometimes the distinctions are subtle, the
causation must be inferred; sometimes it's blatant, as in
Nature Pleads Not Guilty, Garcia's indictment of society
for the worldwide trouble of 1972.
Finally, the degree of certainty one attaches to a diagnosis
or prognosis is a mixture of both belief and style. Scientists
differ in the strength of their own belief in their analyses,
while others, regardless of belief, may speak either softly or
loudly. A recurring problem for scientists who wish to
influence or even to inform is to penetrate the cacophony of
modern communication, to secure a place on the agendas of
the media, the public, the decision makers. Thus, some opt
to speak loudly either from belief or from necessity or both.
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To overstate your case has become commonplace because to
understate it may mean it will never be considered.
These three dimensions-the trends forseen, their causes,
and the certainty with which they are proclaimed-are
themselves simplifications, but in combination they transcend the usual dichotomous separation between neoMalthusians and anti-Malthusians, growth or no-growth
advocates, prophets of boom or prophets of gloom, cornucopians or catastrophists, or any of the other neat dualisms
that are curren t these days. That the posi tions are more
varied, however, does not seem to diminish the rancor evident in the debate and controversy.
Having cautioned you to take the analyses of others with
a grain of three-dimensional salt requires that I locate
myself along these dimensions. As to trelld, I think we are at
a key turning point away from exponential growth tov,ards
a global steady state, but both exponential growth or overshoot and collapse can still characterize regional de\'elopment. As to calise, I am an interactionist-nature, society,
and technology all contribute to our penultimate problems,
but may vary in importance by problem or setting. As to
certainty, I am cautious-often skeptical-about evidence,
but strongminded as to desired values, while always despairing of being able to separate fact from value.
Let's return to the penultimate problems. In my remaining time, I will address each of the problems in turn, first
summarizing the major trends of the last H years, then
presenting some thoughts as to the dynamics or causal process that underlies the trends, and then concluding with
some personal concerns for the future.
THE MALTHUSIAN DILEMMA
In 1969, the population problem, some called it a bomb,
appeared as such in its usual exponential form (Figure 3).
Here in the early years of the '80s, this penultimate problem
appears to have changed profoundly. It is now possible to
visualize the ultimate population of the earth, ultimate at
least for our lives, our children's, and their children. All
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major demographers agree that we are at the point of inflection where an exponential growth curve begins to be the
S-shaped curve of the logistic. Current estimates (shown in
Figure 4) differ only in timing and ultimate population,
but are bracketed between 8 and 11 billion people with a
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Figure 3. World Populatioll Growth Through History (van del' Tak.
Haub. and Murphy. 1979. p. 2. Courtesy of the Population Referellce
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global steady state beginning as early as 2050. There are
exceptions. Lester Brown (1981) tells us we can have a sustainable world of 6 billion people if we have the will and
foresight, and Herman Kahn (1976) a quadcentennial (2176)
population of 15 billion, give or take a factor of two.
12--------~----·----------------------------------------,

UNITED NATIONS 11.0

9.B WORLD BANK
--------------------------------
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Figure 4. Projections of World Population in 2000 and l'ltimate Stabilized Size (\'an cler Tak. I·!aub. and Murphy. 1979. p. eli!. CourtesY of the
Population Reference Bureau. Inc.)
NOTES: Primary sources rdnred to in this graph include: l'.S. Bureau
of the Census. 1979: World Bank. 1979; l'nited ;'\ations. 1979: Bogul' and
TSlii. 1979.
The U.S. Census Bureau has not published projections b('\ond 2000. The
Worlel Ban k ]lU hI ishes on Iy onl' seril's. Thl' ot her project ions sho\\"n ~IIl'
meeli lim series (bl't \\'('('n high and lo\\" \'arian ts),

If, as I think, we arc at the point of inflection, and rates of
population growth are decreasing, not only in the rich
industrialized world but in many countries in the Third
World, then there is some cause for elation. The task of
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providing a better life for the world's peoples will be
reduced because the declining population signals some
improvement in living standards and life expectancy, and
reduces the burden of providing housing, schooling, and
jobs for the ncw millions. The decline in birthrate that was
evidenced in somt' countries during the '70s puts to rest one
of the deep conflicts in responding to this overriding
issue-whether a decline in tht' rate of population increase
must precede or follow economic improvement and reduction in child mortality. This declint' provides limited support for all of the three major theories of the demographic
transition: economic development, birth control, and national culture. The largest reductions were in nations with
high rates of development, with strong population control
policies and actions, and primarily in the culture zone of
East and Southeast Asia. But population decline occurred
in lesser degree where only one or t\yO of the three factors
were present. \Ve learned that population control could
precede economic development, albeit at a slower rate, at
least in cultures that prove receptive to it-much as we
recently learned that French people regulated their population, for reasons that are not clear. a ccntury ahead of the
other nations of Western Europe. beginning prior to the
industrial revolution. For 100 years. as shown in Figure 5,
French mothers had a third fewer children than mothers in
the rest of \\'estt'rn Europe.
While the transition to a steady-state world is in sight, it
will be uneven-varying from Europe and North America,
where 26 nations have essentially achieved zero population
growth, to Africa. where population will increase tenfold
over the next 75 years. African demographic exceptional ism
is particularly evident in projectl'cl growth rates for the year
2,000, at which time it is expected that 75% of Asian populations will be growing at very fast rates (2.1 % or higher),
compared with only 30% of Latin American and 10% of
Asian populations (Tsui and Bogue, 1978).
If we stabilize at 10 billion people, there will be cause for
satisfaction, but quiet at best; the world of 2050 will be a
world with 2 112 times the current population-with 2 112
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1800,1 in 5 persons was a European, 1 in 14 and African. In
the years following 2050, the figures will be reversed, with
profound effects on issues of power, migration, and race.
Nor will the steady state be necessarily a happy statewestern values are rooted in accumulation, achievement,
and growth. The hierarchy of social organization permitted
by upward mobility will need to change in a world of more
limited demands and opportunities. What to replace it with
will be a major challenge.
That the turning point in global population was revealed in the 1970s does not, of course, signal an end to the
Malthusian dilemma, or a reduction in the controversies
between anti-Malthusian and neo-Malthusian thought.
The remarkable thing about Mal th us' Essay on Population
is not that it fits the cynical definition of a classic given by
Petersen (1979): "a work that everyone ci tes but no one
reads," but that, despite its repeated refutation, both in theory and observation, it arises anew in each successive intellectual generation by successive expansion of the numerator
of resources and the denominator of population (Figure 7).
In 1798, the numerator of the Malthusian equation was
solely food and agricultural land, not because Malthus was
ignorant of other natural resource needs, but because food
requirements so dominated other needs. By the 1850s, however, the food requirements were expanded to other energy
and material resources, marked by the classic volume of
Jevons (1865) in Britain on the coal question, at the same
time as national censuses made possible expansion of the
denominator as well. In the United States, the counterpart
development might have been the plea of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in 1873
and 1890 (1890) for forest conservation. Food, however, does
not disappear; it persists as a concern but on a wider population scale.
The postwar United States would mark a new turning
point with the Paley Commission report (President's Materials Policy Commission, 1952), discounting fears as to
resource scarcity and laying the groundwork for a new definition of the Malthusian numerator involving amenity
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Figure 7. Expanding the Malthusian Equation: Resources Divided by
Population.

resources and the pollution-absorbing capacity of the environment. The Stockholm Conference on the Environment
in 1972 would enlarge these concerns to a global scale centered on the biosphere and the basic life-support system of
biogeochemical cycles. The final extension is the current
concern with extinction (Regenstein, 1975; Myers, 1979;
Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1981), and predictions of massive species destruction over the next several decades.
But the earlier definitions by no means disappear; they
persist. In the 1970s the concern with food adequacy gets
new life in the context of the Sahelian drought. The concern with energy and material resource adequacy is revived
by the massive increase in commodity prices during that
decade and the recognition of the limitations of oil reserves.
As with the earlier Malthusian predictions, the neoMalthusian predictions also fail. A classic case, of course, is
Jevons (1865) on the coal question. An extrapolation of the

14

/

The Human Environment

growth in coal use from the time he wrote his book is
shown in Figure 8A along with the actual course of British
coal production. These figures bear a striking similarity to
those represented in Figure 8B, a recent projection concerning oil use taken from the Global 2,000 reports extrapolating 1950-75 oil growth with Hubbert's projection of
expected U.S. oil production.
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Figure 8. Extrapolating Coal lIse from 1861, Oil Use from 1975 (Jevons.
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Nonetheless. it is safe to predict that neo-Malthusian
debate will persist, and along these particular lines: food
adequacy will be of most serious concern in Africa; energy
adequacy in terms of alternatives for industrialized countries and in terms of fuel wood and high import prices in
developing countries; pollution in the megacities of the
developing world; species in the tropical rain forest; and the
biosphere in the context of the increasing human modification of the atmosphere.
To sum up the Malthusian dilemma. the last 14 years
have seen a declining rate of population growth everwhere
but in Africa, with future projections of a global steadystate population of from 8-11 billion occurring as early as
2050. Support is found for all the major theories of the
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demographic transItIOn debated in the early years of the
'70s. At the same time, the numerator of concern in the
Malthusian equation continues to expand and the Malthusian equation is constantly redefined anew, providing
plenty of concerns for the future.
GLOBAL CONCENTRATIONS OF
WEALTH AND POVERTY
In 1969, average per capita income for the developing
countries was $204, compared with $2,460 for the industrialized countries, a ratio of 1 to 12. In 1980, the figures had
risen to $820 and $8,505, respectively, a ratio of 1 to 10
(Sivard, 1982). In absolute terms the rich had grown much
richer, but not in relative terms, although the poor were
still very poor. The worldwide stagflation had taken its toll
on the industrialized nations' growth, while it had penalized developing countries with an order of magnitude
increase in oil prices, high interest rates, and low demand
and prices for most export commodities.
The penultimate problem of pm'eny and wealth in 1969
anticipated social disorder and conflict, and there were
plenty of both in the 1970s, Since 1969, 43 wars claimed at
least 8.3 million lives (Sivard, 1982), primarily in the poor

D
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Figure 9, Wars, 1969-1981 (after Sivard, 1982)
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parts of the world (Figure 9). Since 1968, there were 7,425
internationally related terrorist incidents (U.S. Department
of State, 1982). Amnesty International kept records on some
4,952 prisoners of conscience in 1981 (Amnesty International, 1982) and urged action in behalf of prisoners in 67
countries. Major attempts to ameliorate North-South tension in the form of the Brandt report (1980), the new economic order, aid distribution, or trade concessions basically
failed. Official development assistance was .34% of industrial nation gross national product (GNP) in 1970, and.35%
in 1981 (SivaI'd, 1982). The U.S. proportion was second
lowest among 17 industrial nations and a national disgrace.
The global concentration of wealth and poverty is foremost an issue of political economy, not of the human environment. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that
economy and environment interact in at least two important ways: on the one hand, economy may prevent the realization of feasible improvements in the human environment;
on the other, within specific regional contexts, environment
often exacerbates the disparity between nations.
By the end of the '70s, the sociopolitical, rather than the
technical, obstacles of many environmental issues were
clear. There was a consensus that, in the aggregate, food
supplies were adequate to feed all the world's peopleshortages were limited to region or class (Figure 10). Thirty
percent of the population of low-income countries may be
malnourished, but poverty rather than environment was
the prime source.
Similarly, there is a growing consensus on other issues of
health andmonality. Based on the experience since 1969, it
now seems clear that communicable diseases that take the
lives of 5 million children a year can be eradicated as was
smallpox (Holdgate, Kassas, and White, 1982); that improved water and sanitation are in reach of the rural peoples
of the world, as they have been provided for urban people
(United Nations, 1980); that death from disaster can be
reduced by at least half, using the best practices currently
available in developing countries (Burton, Kates and
White, 1978); and that pollution can be controlled for about
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1-2% of GNP, as is being done in many industrialized
nations (Holdgate, Kassas, and White, 1982). In each of
these areas, there is more knowledge than is currently used;
what is needed is a lillie wealth and much will.
Political economy and environment converge to produce
a class of small, low-income nations that are the poorest-ofthe-poor (Figure II). Indeed, the gap between them and

o
o

ASIAN MOUNTAIN
COASTAL WEST AFRICAN

~ EASTERN AFRICAN
~ SAHEL
_

SOUTHERN AFRICAN

Figure II. Least-Developed Nations (Clark University Program
International Development and Social Changt'o 1974)
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other developing nations is growing rapidly, both absolutely and relatively. This is a map of the so-called "leastdeveloped nations," a dubious accolade, whose criteria (per
capita GNP, illiteracy, percent manufacturing) were defined
when I was in the employ of one such nation. With the best
of intentions, there was hope that identifying this group of
nations would entitle them to special considerations of
need in global aid distributions anel in trade adjustments.
Five years after this designation, home in America, my
colleagues and I were struck by the nonrandom location of
these nations. Located mainly in Africa, they are peripheral
not only to the core centers of world power, but within their
own regions as well. Their small size, landlockedness,
regional peripherality, and arid or mountain environments
combine to enhance the effects of political-economic poverty. It is not environment that makes them poor, but it is
environment that makes them the poorest-of-the-poor.
Looking to the future, the most immediate response to
the global inequalities of wealth will be an ever-accelerated
pattern of national and international migration reproducing that which has already occurred in Europe Crable 2)
Receiving Countries
Sending
Countries

Total

250
Greece
Italy
500
510
Portugal
640
Spain
Yugoslavia 490
2,390
Total

West
Germany France Switzerland Belgium

240
230
40
150
400
1,060

100
450
330
55
940

Netherlands

150

12

100
25
280

40

20

70

40

Table 2. European Migration Balances, 1960-1970 (in thousands)
(Bouvier, Shryock, and Hendnson, 1977, p. l:l. Courtesy of the Populalion Rdl'reIHl' Bm('au, Inc.)
"Less than 10,000.

and North America. The great disparity in numbers between Europe and Africa will result in massive African
outmigration, with Africans occupying the migrant worker
status of current-day Latins. This outmigration is already
evident in France today (Table 3). In the Americas, the legal
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Nationality
Algeria
Portugal
Italy
Spain
Morocco
Tunisia
Poland
Yugoslavia
Other
Total
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Number
(OOOs)

% of Foreign

884.3
858.9
558.2
531.4
322.1
167.5
86.4
77.8

709.5

21.1
20.5
13.3
12.7
7.7
4.0
2.1
1.8
16.8

4,196.1

100.0

Population

Table 3. Foreign :\'ationals in Francl'. 197ti (in thousands) (Boll\'ier.
Shryock, and Hl'ndl'rson. 1977. p. l:l. Courtl'sy of the Population Reference Bureau, Inc.)

and illegal migration across the permeable U.S. border will
accelerate, illegal migration at the Mexican frontier having
recently doubled in direct response to the devaluation of the
peso. One recent projection (Davis, 1982) of a I.S million
annual immigration to the United States, which is only a
half again larger than current estimates of immigration
(legal and illegal), sees an Hispanic-Black-Asian majority
in the United States by the middle of the next century.
These massive migrations will bring fresh energy, new culture, and old issues of power, exploitation, and racism to
most of the wealthy world.
To sum up, the rich grow richer absolutely, less so relatively, as an ever more important gap appears among the
poor countries. with the emergence of a persistent group of
least-developed countries. In such a world, social disorder is
commonplace. and unmet human needs mock the great
potential for the betterment of human existence. The basic
causes, rooted in political economy, arc beyond my competence to analyze, but un met human needs could be met with
modest reallocation of resources and national leadership.
The least-developed nations remain so. their problems
exacerbated by environmental and spatial location. The
gaps will be most evident between Africa and the rest of the
world, and the accelerating migration from poor to rich
countries will bring new problems and opportunities.
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THE SOQALCONTROL OF TECHNOLOGY
There is a basic asymmetry between the benefits and risks
of a technology. With the exception of those technologies
the function of which is to kill or destroy (weapons, chain
saws, pesticides, antibiotics), most technologies only create
hazards incidental to their production and beneficial use.
Thus the identification of a technological hazard and social
efforts to control it inevitably lag behind a given technology's use. The vested interests of both technology sponsor
and consumers further restrain social control.
In the 1970s, the lag between technology development
and hazard control diminished considerably both for old
and new technologies. This is shown for 6 hazards in Figure 12. In the United States, for example, much of the '70s
was marked by the discovery of the "hazard-of-the-week"·Cadmium
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Figure 12. Technological Development and Hazard Control (based on
estimates by M. Morrison, Clark University)
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between 40-50 new or newly discovered hazards were featured in the media each year. This increase in hazard
management arose from several sources.
Commoner (1971) argued that changes in technology
since World War II have been fundamental and disjunctive,
not simply the continuation of processes initiated by the
industrial revolution. The most dramatic technological
threat was the introduction of nuclear weapons in 1945.
Less dramatic, but also significant, was the synthesis, largescale production, and disposal of thousands of new chemicals, and the mobilization and concentration of fossil
energy and naturally scattered materials.
While one may argue about whether World War II
represents a technological watershed and that the spate of
hazard identification is the delayed recognition of the perils
of progress, there have also been major improvements in
the ways in which hazards are identified and monitored.
These include new screening techniques with low-cost
tests; computer modeling of hazardous sources, pathways,
and sinks; monitoring networks for major air, land, and
water pollutants; and rapid growth in general scientific
effort devoted to hazard research.
Along with the disjunctive change in technologies and
improved means of hazard identification, the public, too,
has become more sensitive to hazard. More than 78% of the
public perceive greater risk today than in the last 20 years,
contrary to the expectations of most experts (Harris, 1980).
The source of this changing public perception is not
wholly clear. Part of it lies in the actual and identified
increase in hazardous technologies and in the attention
provided to them by both scientists and the media. But there
are also deeper roots: the concern with radiation and chemicals may be replacing older insecurities, enhanced by the
periodic fluctuations of optimism and despair in public
mood, and by the politics of liberalism and conservatism.
Whether pu blic perception matches the reality of hazard,
the burden of hazard on society is a large one. In the United
States alone, the estimated social costs of hazards associated
with the manufacture and use of technology-including

22

/

The Human Environment

property damage, losses of productivity from illness or
death, and most but not all of the costs of controlamounted to between $179 and $283 billion in 1979 (Table
4), equivalent to 7.8%-12.4% of GNP (Tuller, forthcoming).
Cost To
Private Sector
Federal Government
State and Local
Government
Public
Total
Total Costs and Losses

Cost of Control Damage and Loss
67.4-80.4
21.7-34.8
11.0-17.3
31.7-52.1
99.1-132.5

Not Available
79.8-150.2

178.9-282.7

Table 4. Social COSLS. Damages. anJ Losses from Technological
HazarJs. 1979 (in millions of Jollars) (TlIlln. forthcoming)

Similarly, from 15% to 25% of the annual mortality is associated with \'arious technologies (Harriss, Hohenemser,
and Kates, 1978). No similar analyses have been done elsewhere in the world, but there is every reason to believe that
such patterns of damage and loss w(ndd be found equally in
most industrialized countries and in urban areas of developing countries, ,,\'here the damage estimates might even be
greater.
Despite this large toll, there are grounds for cautious
optimism. Most acute effects (e.g., accidental injury) of
technology have been on the decline or have held relatively
constant. Cancer rates, with three exceptions (declining
stomach and uterine, rising lung cancer), have been relatively constant, although studies claim a significant increase in the 1970-76 period in the United States, with later
data still unavailable (Schneiderman, 1982). Significant
progress in the United States has been made in reducing
levels of 3 of the 5 major air pollutants (Conservation
Foundation, 1982), and national surveys, while revealing
epidemic proportions of deleterious blood-lead levels in
children, demonstrate nevertheless a marked and gratifying
decrease (Figure 13). The llNEP World Environment report finds that despite rising human impacts on natural
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systems, the overall short-term productivity of soil, ocean,
and forest has not been significantly impaired (Holdgate,
Kassas, and White, 1982). Thus, for technologies whose
consequences are immediate, whose sources are identifiable, and whose mechanisms are reasonably well understood, the problem of achieving a tolerable level of risk is
expensive and challenging but acceptable. a concomitant to
the widespread beneficial use of modern technology.
More difficult to deal with are acute hazards of a rare
catastrophic nature, or slow and cumulative hazards of
great persistence, spread, or toxicity. Our recent compari-
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son of 93 technological hazards has identified 5 sets of
extreme hazards, 4 of which represent difficult types to cope
with (Table 5). These 4 are intentional biocides, the persistent, delayed teratogens, the rare catastrophes, and the diffuse global threats. The fifth group is composed of
common killers, such as automobiles or black-lung disease.
Class
I. Hazards
II. Extreme Hazards
1. Intentional Biocides
2. Persistent Teratogens
3. Rare Catastrophes
4. Diffuse Global Threats
5. Common Killers
III. Multiple Extreme Hazards

Examples
Appliances, Aspirin, Bicycles,
Saccharin, Skateboards
Antibiotics, Chain Saws,
Vaccines
Mercury, Uranium Mining
Aviation Crashes, LNG
Explosions
Fossil Fuel·COlo Ozone
Depletion
Auto Crashes, Coal Mining
Nuclear War, Pesticides,
Recombinant DNA

Table 5. Taxonomy of Tcchnolo?;ical f lat_anls

The intentional biocides derive their lethality from the
great toxicity involved in the design of technologies to hUrl
living organisms: humans in the case of wc-apons, insects
with pesticides, vegetation with herbicides and chainsaws,
and bacteria and viruses with drugs. Highly efficient, these
technologies are usually narrowly targeted and access to
them is restricted. But, if by error of decision or application
or by intention, they drift off target, then they are enormously dangerous. Thus, in our time we have already seen
nuclear war in Japan, massive pesticide poisoning in Pakistan, and worldwide penicillin-resistant strains of
gonorrhea.
Persistent, drlayed teratogen.s and mutagens comprise a
class of hazards whose inherent danger arises from the potentiating combination of characteristics, each of which is
threatening but manageable by itself. The combination of
long life for the material, long delay until consequences
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appear, and transgenerational impact make them so hazardous. Metals such as cadmium, selenium, antimony, molybdenum, lead, and mercury have human-created fluxes of
between 5 LO 80 times those found in nature. All of these can
accumulate slowly, and persist almost forenT to cause serious disruption to living organisms, especially fetuses.
Several are also mutagenic. Heavy mClals and radiation
have already caused numerous outbreaks and a fl'\\' major
epidemics such as mercury-caused MinamaLa disease in
Japan and the seed-grain mass poisoning in Iraq.
For most of the rare catastrophes the mechanisms are well
understood: a jumbo jet collision, collapsC' of a dam, a
n uclC'ar reaClor accidelll, an Ll\' G (I iq uelied nat ural gas)
tank explosion. or the fall of a satellite. WC' haH' alread\'
had a number of major dam failures, only one jumbo jet
collision, a single LNG tank explosion. and near misses
with satC'llites and nuclear reactors. Howe\'C'r, for some
potential catastrophes such as the accidental creation of a
virulent microorganism using recombinant DNA technology, the threat. while possible. is almost impossible LO
assess rdiably or pC'rhaps C'vC'n to verify if it did occur.
Finally, thert' are the dijju.\(' global threats caused by
matC'rials worlll\\'ide in their disbursement that slowly but
steadily accumulate mainly in or through thC' atmosphC're
and threaten to change the climate, destroy the protC'ctive
ozone layer, or increase the acidity of precipitation. The
threats are idelllifiable, but much scientific uncertainty still
remains rC'garding the spcC'd at which they are evolving, the
sourcc:'s, thC' mechanisms, anclthe impacts. We do know that
the annual release of C02 into the atmosphere is equal to
about 10% of that used by plants; nitric oxidC's and nitrate
products produced by human sources are about 50% of what
the biosphere produces naturally. and more sulphur dioxide enters the atmosphere from human activities than is
exchanged naturally (Holdgate, Kassas, and White, 1982).
This taxonomy of hazards lends itself to a priority list or
to a hazard agenda (recall Table 5). A few hazards are extreme in more than one of the 5 dimensions-for example,
the radiation effects of nuclear war, recombinant DNA, and
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some pesticides. Most hazards are not extreme in any
dimension, for instance, saccharin, aspirin, household
appliances, or skateboards. In between are examples of
hazards that are extreme in one or another major group.
This suggests a modified form of "triage": extraordinary
attention to the multiple extreme hazards, distinctive effort
appropriate to each of the groups of extreme hazards, and
an ordered but routine response for the remainder.
The years ahead should bring a continuation of the helpful trends of the '70s despite some of the current retreat from
caution. The public has been remarkably consistent in its
desire for environmental protection and health safety (Figure 14). However, a diminution in the publicly recorded
fears for the future will not occur until we understand the
Percent
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Figure 14. Public Pnception of Environll1elllal Laws and Regulations,
1973-1981 (Conservation Foundation. 1982a. p. ·125. Courtesy of the
Conservation Foundation and the American Entnprise Institute)
NOTE; The primary source of the information repn'seilled in the graph
reproduced I)('re is the Roper Organization Polls, 1973-1981. The question asked was; Thert' art' ... differing opinions about how far we've
gone with environmental protection laws and regulations, Atthe present
time, do you think environmel1lal protection laws and regulations have
gone too far, or not far enough, or have struck about the right balance?
"Don't know/no answer" responses (not plotted) ranged between 10%
and 21%.
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mechanisms of the major human diseases of industrial
countries (cancer and atherosclerosis), determine the effects
on the biosphere of human-induced changes in energy and
materials flow, and learn to control the irrational insecurity
of the arms race.
In the developing world the situation is more worrisome.
Technologies that are tightly controlled in industrial countries, such as pesticides or antibiotics, are readily available
in many developing countries. The great urban centers of
the Third World display patterns of auto injury or pollution that exceed those of many wealthy cities, and at the
same time they maintain an environment of infectious disease and malnutrition comparable to or exceeding those of
rural areas. In the year 2000, there may be 61 such cities
with populations exceeding 4 million, including Mexico
City with 32 million people, S~lO Paulo with 26 million,
and 8 others with over 15 million people.
For the industrialized countries, I find particularly troubling the structural changes taking places in the roles of
scientist, technologist, and entrepreneur and in the basic
division of labor among scientific discovery of principles,
technological de\'elopment of devices or processes using
them, and entrepreneurial production and distribution.
There is an inevitable lag between hazard creation and
hazard identification. Scientists, knowledgeable about the
basic principles of a technology but uninvolved in its
development, serve to provide early warning and identification of hazard. But in the three major technologies of the
last 40 years, this has broken down: in the creation of the
atom bomb, in computer and related information technologies, and in the emerging biotechnology. In the first case,
the dual wartime role of the scientist and technologist that
created the bomb ended for some scientists rather quickly.
These then became "critical scientists,"to use Ravetz's term
(1971), and many of them served and continue to serve to
warn us of the dangers of the arms race.
In contrast, the subtle consequences, both good and bad,
of the information revolution have not emerged yet. Indeed,
we still know surprisingly little about television's effects
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after 20 years of intensive study (Graham and Kasperson,
forthcoming). Fortunately, the first-order consequences of
information technologies do not appear to affect health and
environment directily (with the exception of radiation and
certain chemicals).
Most troubling of all for me is the emergent biotechnology, but not because I possess expert knowledge of its
hazards. What disturbs me is the structure of the technology,
with scientific experiments, technological development,
and entrepreneurial production collapsed into a continuous activity, and those most knowledgeable playing all three
roles in a rush to early discovery, innovation of use, and
profit. Theoretically, biotechnology is extremely powerful,
and I worry that even the much-improved societal hazard
management developed in the last decade cannot cope with
its challenge in the face of the massive co-optation of the
relevant scientific community.
To sum up, despite an expanding technology and growing hazard perception, there are encouraging signs of
improving social control, albeit at a high cost of between
7-12% of equivalent GNP. The basic lag between benefit
and hazard identification is diminishing even though the
new hazards are more subtle and less evident, supported in
part by the increased social sensitivity-some would argue
hypersensitivity-to hazard. It is now possible to draw up
an agenda of particularly hazardous types based on physical, biological, and social characteristics. Worrisome for the
future is the consolidation of roles in technology development as exemplified in the emerging biotechnology and the
ready diffusion of hazardous technology in the Third World
without the institution of social control.
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CONCLUSION
By profession I am a worrier, a scientific worrier in my
chosen corner of the human environment. I try to measure,
weigh, and anticipate what to take seriously, what to
ignore, what to act upon, and what to study more. The
penultimate problems of human existence are megaworries, and tonight I have reported on their state over the
14 years since I began systematically to contemplate them.
By personality, I am an optimist, but I worry about the
interaction of personality and profession-does my internal
biology of hope (Tiger, 1979) distort my scientific judgment? Yet I must report hope, surely for at least two of the
three penultimate problems. A historic turning point has
been reached in world popUlation numbers. There is a
growing competence in the social control of technology in
industrialized countries. Even the disparity between rich
and poor has slowed, albeit in a surprising way by the
humbling of the rich rather than the elevation of the poor.
Yet there is still much cause for concern:
I) It is overwhelming to find that our leaders continue to
engage in the endless overkill of the arms race.
2) It is frustrating to know the potential to eliminate death
from hunger, disease, and disaster and how little that potential has been realized.
3) It is worrying that in the aggregate we still know so little
about the impans of the 3 great technological innovations of the last half century.

As a professional worrier, I recently had a surpnsmg
interchange with an old friend in the course of doing a
videotape interview. She asked me: "As you look to the
future, what is the thing you fear most and what is the
thing you hope most?" I hemmed and hawed, thought frantically, mentally reviewed my current list of 17 natural and
93 technological hazards, and then spontaneously blurted
out "The loss of hope, and the loss of idealism."
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If we come to accept the inevitability of nuclear war, the
persistence of hunger and disease, the mindless autonomy
of technological change, then they surely will come to pass.
It is only that curious mixture of faith and necessity that we
call hope that can keep the penultimate problems in their
place.
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